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CURATIVE ACTS AND LIMITATIONS ACTS
DESIGNED TO REMEDY DEFECTS IN
FLORIDA LAND TITLES -IV*
JAMES W. DAY**
PART IV -

CURATIVE AcTs WITH LIMITATIONS PROVISIONS

In order to remedy title defects in factual situations that are not
reached by either pure curative acts or the limitations acts upon
which the doctrine of acquisition of title to land by adverse possession is based, another type of remedial statute has been devised.
For these statutes, this writer has coined the term "curative acts with
a limitations provision" to differentiate them from other limitations
acts that serve a different purpose. They actually are limitations
acts and differ from other limitations acts only with reference to the
function they are designed to perform. Consequently, they are subject to the same rules that are applicable to other limitations acts.
Curative acts with a limitations provision are distinguished from
mere curative acts by the fact that they do not purport to validate
defects immediately upon their enactment. They are statutes designed
to rectify stated irregularities in transactions or proceedings either (1)
by limiting the time for the assertion of the invalidity of a transaction
or proceeding completed before their enactment to a stated period
after the passage of the act in question or (2) by requiring an attack
on a transaction or proceeding consummated after their enactment, to
be made, if at all, within a stated time after some step in the transaction or proceeding itself.
These statutes can cure any defect that can be remedied by a
curative act, since any result capable of achievement by an act that
validates an irregularity immediately upon the act's becoming effective is of course not prevented by the fact that the statute provides a
period subsequent to its effective date during which the defect can
be attacked. They can in addition perfect the imperfect title of a
claimant of land and divest the title of the true owner if the true
*Parts I-III of this article appeared in Vol. VIII, No. 4, A Symposium on Real
Property Law.
*B.S. 1914, A.M. 1916, B.S. in Education 1917, University of Missouri; J.D. 1927,
University of Florida; Professor of Law, University of Florida.
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owner fails to attack the imperfect title within the period stipulated,
provided the period is of reasonable length and provided there is
available to the true owner during the running of the period a cause
of action for the recovery of possession of the land. In such instances,
vested rights of the true owner are destroyed, a result that cannot be
achieved by a pure curative act.1 Curative acts with limitations provisions, however, like all other limitations acts, can bar any right,
vested or otherwise, provided the application of the act to the facts
at hand does not violate constitutional safeguards. 2 It is evident, for
example, that, subject to the foregoing qualification, they can validate the defective acknowledgement of a married woman even in
jurisdictions in which a defect of this kind is beyond the reach of
a mere curative act.
These acts are not recent innovations, although they had their
origin at a time less remote than that of pure curative acts. Although
most of the Florida statutes of this type were enacted during and
subsequent to the land boom of 1925, a few were passed long before
that event. Section 20 of chapter 1887 of the Laws of 1872, for example,
provided that a delinquent taxpayer could not bring suit after one
year from the record of a deed made "in pursuance of any sale of
lands for taxes" to set aside the tax deed or to recover the lands from
the grantee named in the tax deed.3 A statute almost identical with
the one just mentioned was enacted in 1874. 4 Chapter 6925 of the
'Horton v. Carter, 253 Ala. 325, 45 So.2d 10 (1950); Fugman v. Jiri Washington
Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 209 Ill. 176, 70 N.E. 644 (1904); Merchants Bank v. Ballou, 98
Va. 112, 32 S.E. 481 (1899); accord, Forster v. Forster, 129 Mass. 559 (1880); Merrill
v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199 (1818); Cromwell v. MacLean, 123 N.Y. 474, 25 N.E. 932
(1890); Summer v. Mitchell, 29 Fla. 179, 203, 10 So. 562, 566 (1892) (dictum); Inhabitants of Otisfield v. Scribner, 129 Me. 311, 314, 151 At. 670, 671 (1930) (dictum);
Addison v. Fleenor, 65 Wyo. 119, 126, 196 P.2d 991, 993 (1948) (dictum).
2E.g., Dunkum v. Maceck Bldg. Corp., 256 N.Y. 275, 176 N.E. 392 (1931); Meigs
v. Roberts, 162 N.Y. 371, 56 N.E. 838 (1900).
3The decision in Carncross v. Lykes, 22 Fla. 587 (1886), drastically curtailed the

effectiveness of this statute. A tract of land had been indefinitely described on
the assessment roll. It was held that the resulting tax deed therefore was not one
made "in pursuance of any sale of lands for taxes" and was not within the scope
of the statute. This case was followed in Grissom v. Furman, 22 Fla. 581 (1886), in
which the township and range numbers of a tract had been reversed on the assessment roll and the land had been described both there and in the tax deed as a
fractional part of a designated section without specifying which part was intended.
4Fla. Laws 1874, c. 1976, §63. It was held in Sloan v. Sloan, 25 Fla. 53, 5 So.
603 (1889), that a tax deed resulting from an assessment made by the county collector instead of by the assessor was not one made "in pursuance of any sale of
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Laws of 1915 provided that conveyances theretofore made to a grantee
with the word "trustee" appended to his name should, in the absence
of a designation of the beneficiaries or purposes of the trust in the
conveyance or in a declaration of trust recorded at the time of the
recording of the conveyance or within seven years thereafter, have
the effect of passing to the grantee a fee simple estate with power
to convey the legal and beneficial interest, unless the validity of the
conveyance should be attacked within six months of the effective
date of the act.5
Curative acts with limitations provisions were at first most frequently passed in Florida and elsewhere with reference to defective
tax deeds; but others dealing with other matters, as, for example, the
Florida statute last mentioned, have since been enacted. Some of
the more recent acts of this type have a very extensive scope.
A sudden increase in the number of real estate transactions and a
rapid, though often temporary and illusory, increment in land values
accompanied the boom of 1925.6 This situation focused attention on
the fact that in Florida, as in other jurisdictions, many land titles
are defective. In an attempt to alleviate the resulting difficulties
numerous remedial statutes were enacted. Limitations provisions
were incorporated in some of the acts passed at that timer in order
lands for taxes" within the terms of this statute. In Townsend v. Edwards, 25 Fla.
582, 6 So. 212 (1889), it was held to be error for the trial court to refuse to permit
the introduction in evidence of the assessment roll for the purpose of showing that
the land had not been assessed for the year for which the tax deed issued and that
consequently it was not within the validating provision of this act. In Bird v.
Benlisa, 142 U.S. 664 (1892), the four Florida cases cited in this footnote and the
preceding one were followed in holding that when land is not assessed by an official
or accurate description the resulting tax deed is not within the scope of this Florida
statute.
sThis statute as amended by Fla. Laws 1919, c. 7838, §10(11), now is found in
FLA. STAT. §689.07 (1955). Among the changes effectuated by the amendment was
the deletion of the limitations provision.
OThe existence of this boom, the numerous speculative transactions that characterized the period, the disastrous collapse in 1926, and the resulting deflation of
real estate values are to such an extent matters of common knowledge that the
Court takes judicial notice of them. Mahood v. Bessemer Properties, Inc., 154 Fla.
710, 18 So.2d 775 (1944); Harbeson v. Mering, 147 Fla. 174, 2 So.2d 886 (1941); Coral
Gables v. State, 128 Fla. 874, 176 So. 40 (1937); Smith v. Massachusetts Mutual Life
Ins. Co., 116 Fla. 890, 156 So. 498 (1934).
7E.g., Fla. Laws 1925, c. 10168 (this act as amended by Fla. Laws 1941, c. 20954,
§14, now exists as FLA. STAT. §95.22 (1955); Fla. Laws 1925, c. 10171, now FLA. STAT.

§95.23 (1955).
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to obtain the increased effectiveness that curative acts with limitations
provisions have over pure curative acts. Many of the more recent
remedial acts also are of this type.8
Importance of Ascertaining Exact Scope of Act
That curative acts with limitations provisions and pure curative
acts operate only on factual situations that come within their terms
may seem too obvious to deserve mention. These acts - particularly
those of the former type- are often so worded, however, that a
casual reading will lead one to believe them to be applicable to
situations that actually are not within their scope.
In Thompson v. Thompson,9 for example, the Florida Court held
that a void gratuitous conveyance of homestead from a husband to
his wife was validated as against the husband and the children of
the couple by the lapse during the life of the husband of the limitations period of twenty years from the record of the deed, which
is established by section 95.23 of Florida Statutes 1955. While it is
the opinion of this writer, as is indicated in detail hereinafter, that
the application of this statute to the facts at hand violated constitutional principles, the situation is within the language of the statute.
Immediately after quoting the statute, however, the Court made
these statements:
"F.S. §95.2b, F.S.A. has reduced the limitation to ten years.
"F.S. §694.08, F.S.A. validates instruments of record of more
than seven years which are defective by reason of execution."
Although the reference to these statutes was probably made merely
to call attention to the legislative policy concerning defective titles,
it is couched in such terms as to suggest that they are applicable to the
question before the Court. Any inference to that effect is unwarranted. Each statute merely purports to validate under stated
circumstances instruments that are subject to such defects as im8E.g., FLA. STAT. §§95.26-.35, 192A8, 196.09-.11, 692.03, 694.04, 694.08, 695.01,
695.03, 695.05, 695.20 (1955). No attempt is made herein to set forth all of the
numerous Florida curative acts and curative acts with limitations provisions. A
number of them will be described, however. At least most of the Florida statutes

of this kind that were in effect in 1948 are discussed in an article by William H.
Rogers in 22 FLA. LJ. 153 (1948) entitled "Florida Curative Statutes."
970 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1953).
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perfections in acknowledgments and relinquishments of dower or
omissions of seals and witnesses. The validation of a gratuitous conveyance of homestead by an owner who has children is not within their
scope. Section 694.08, furthermore, by its own terms does not cure
even the defects to which it is directed unless one or more conveyances of the land or of parts of it have been executed and recorded
by the parties claiming under the defective instrument. There had
been no such conveyance by the grantee wife in the Thompson case. 10
Section 693.03 of Florida Statutes 1955 is a statute that can be
misconstrued as applying to situations that actually are beyond its
scope. It provides that the acknowledgement by a married woman of
deeds, relinquishments of dower, and other instruments is necessary
to entitle them to be recorded, but that no private examination of
her separate from her husband is required for any purpose. After
stipulating that the acknowledgment of an instrument by a married
woman does not constitute any part of its execution, it sets forth a
suggested form for acknowledgments and provides than an acknowledgment substantially in that form is sufficient for use by any individual. The limitations provision of the act reads:
"All acknowledgments by a married woman in accordance
with §693.03, as hereby amended, made before May 13, 1943,
are hereby validated, unless the same shall be questioned in a
court of competent jurisdiction within one year after May
13, 1943."
It is to be observed that while this statute, in the case of an
instrument executed by a married woman on or after May 13, 1943,
both eliminates her acknowledgment as a prerequisite to the validity
of the instrument and renders unnecessary her separate acknowledgment for any purpose, the limitations provision with reference to
acknowledgments made by a married woman before that date purports
to validate only the omission of her separate acknowledgment. The
total omission of an acknowledgment of an instrument executed by
a married woman before May 13, 1943, is not within the terms of
the provision.
A question exists, also, as to the scope of the validating provision
loThe grantee wife in the Thompson case had devised the land to the defendant.
This devise cannot be regarded as a subsequent recorded conveyance, particularly
since her will had not even been probated when the litigation began.
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of section 689.11 of Florida Statutes 1955.11 This statute empowers
one spouse to convey directly to the other, without the joinder of the
grantee, 1 2 as effectually as if they were not married. It specifies, too,
that a spouse holding a fee simple title can create an estate by the
entirety by conveying to the other spouse by a deed in which the purpose to create that estate is stated. And it declares:
"(2)

All deeds heretofore made by a husband direct to his
wife or by a wife direct to her husband are hereby validated
and made as effectual to convey the title as they would have
been were the parties not married;
"(4) Provided further, that this section shall not apply to
any conveyance heretofore made, the validity of which shall
be contested by suit commenced within one year of the effective
date of this law."
Section 689.11 of Florida Statutes 1941,"3 of which the present

act is an amendment, is identical with the present act except that it
contains no authorization for one spouse so to convey to the other
as to make the grantee a tenant by the entirety with the grantor. It
contains the same validating provision with reference to deeds previously executed that is found in the present act. The validating
provision of the present act is not needed, therefore, with reference
to the conveyances from one spouse to the other that were authorized
by the act of 1941 or that had been cured by the expiration of the
one-year limitations period of that act.' 4 It can consequently be
"Enacted in its present form by Fla. Laws 1947, c. 23964.
l2This statutory provision rendering unnecessary the joinder by a grantee
spouse of course does not eliminate the necessity of joinder by a grantee spouse
that is required by FLA. CONsT. art. X, §4, when the grantor spouse conveys to her
his homestead. Estep v. Herring, 154 Fla. 653, 18 So.2d 683 (1944); Jahn v. Purvis,
145 Fla. 354, 199 So. 340 (1940); cf. Church v. Lee, 102 Fla. 478, 136 So. 242 (1931).
LEnacted by Fla. Laws 1941, c. 20954, §6, effective July 1, 1941. This act was
in turn an amendment of Fla. Laws 1903, c. 5147, §1, which authorized a conveyance
by a husband directly to his wife. The act of 1903 contained a pure curative provision that with certain exceptions purported to validate at once conveyances
made before its effective date by a husband to his wife. It did not, however, authorize even prospectively a conveyance by a wife directly to her husband.
14When the title of one in possession of land has been perfected by the expiration of the period of a limitations act, a subsequent change in the act does not
divest him of it. E.g., Warren County v. Lamkin, 93 Miss. 123, 46 So. 497 (1908);
Howell v. Rowe, 85 Misc. 560, 147 N.Y. Supp. 482 (Sup. Ct. 1914).
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contended that the validating provision in question was designed to
cure at the expiration of its limitations period prior conveyances in
which one spouse had so conveyed to the other as to attempt to
create a tenancy by the entirety, 5 since there is no other purpose
that it can serve. 16
On the other hand, it is to be observed that although the present
act authorizes prospectively conveyances by one spouse to the other,
both generally and when the conveyances are designed to make the
spouses tenants by the entirety, its validating clause merely provides
that "all deeds heretofore made by a husband direct to his wife or
by a wife direct to her husband are hereby validated and made as
effectual . . . as they would have been were the parties not married
S.." It is arguable, therefore, that the validating clause is directed
solely toward the common-law disability of one spouse to convey
directly to the other.Y If so, the statute cannot, in the case of an
151f reliance can be placed on the decision in Johnson v. Landefeld, 138 Fla.
511, 189 So. 666 (1959), the authorization of the present §689.11 for one spouse so
to convey to the other as to create a tenancy by the entirety is superfluous; and so,
too, is its validation of prior conveyances of this type in so far as concerns such
conveyances made subsequent to the time when a spouse of the sex in question was
empowered merely to convey generally to his spouse. The Johnson case, decided
under a statute that merely authorized a husband to convey to his wife, upheld
a conveyance from a husband to his wife for the purpose of making them tenants
by the entirety; but its weight as an authority is weakened by the fact that the
justices divided equally with reference to the question and thus automatically
affirmed the decree of the trial court. The result of the Johnson case has been
reached in a few other jurisdictions, e.g., Cadgene v. Cadgene, 17 N.J. Misc. 332, 8
A.2d 858 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 124 N.J.L. 566, 12 A.2d 635 (1940); Boehringer v.
Schmid, 254 N.Y. 355, 173 N.E. 220 (1930); cf. Dutton v. Buckley, 116 Ore. 661,
242 Pac. 626 (1926). Some decisions have, however, adopted the contrary view, e.g.,
Ames v. Chandler, 265 Mass. 428, 164 N.E. 616 (1929); Stone v. Culver, 286 Mich. 263,
282 N.W. 142 (1938); Dressier v. Mulhern, 77 Misc. 476, 136 N.Y. Supp. 1049 (Sup.
Ct. 1912); accord, Union Guardian Trust Co. v. Vogt, 263 Mich. 330, 248 N.W. 639
(1933). See also 2 AMmCAN LAw OF PROPERTY §66 (Casner ed. 1952); 2 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY §432 (3d ed. 1939); Annot., 166 A.L.R. 1026 (1947), 137 A.L.R. 350
(1942), 132 A.L.R. 632 (1941), 62 A.L.R. 518 (1929).
-OThe force of this contention is weakened by the fact that FLA. STAT. §689.11
(1941), the predecessor of the present act, also validated at the expiration of its
one-year limitations period prior conveyances generally from a husband directly
to his wife, although such conveyances were already valid. Fla. Laws 1903, c. 5147,
the predecessor of FLA. STAT. 1941, authorized the making of such conveyances
subsequent to its effective date, and its curative provision purported to validate
retroactively all conveyances of this kind made before its effective date.
17One spouse could not convey directly to the other at common law. 1 BL. COMM.
*442; Co. Lrrr. *112a.
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instrument executed by one spouse to the other before the effective
date of the statute, supply the unities of time and title that at
common law were prerequisite to the creation of a tenancy by the
entirety s and that some jurisdictions regard as absent in a conveyance made by one spouse to the other. 19 Force is also given to
the contention that such a conveyance is not within the validating
provision of the statute by the fact that a conveyance from one spouse
to the other to create a tenancy by the entirety is not a conveyance
that would be valid if the parties were not married. A tenancy by
20
the entirety can exist only when the co-owners are married.
Necessity of Allowing Reasonable Period for Bringing Action
Defects in prior transactions that are beyond the remedial power
of pure curative acts can be rectified by a curative act with a limitations provision only when the act continues, for a reasonable time
after its passage, the enforceability of any previously existing chose
in action based on the defect. This result is a corollary of the rule
that any limitations act in order to bar existing choses in action must
allow a reasonable period in which actions on them can be com21
menced.

182 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §6.6 (Casner ed. 1952).
'9E.g., Stone v. Culver, 286 Mich. 263, 282 N.W. 142 (1938); Dressier v. Mulhern,
77 Misc. 476, 136 N.Y. Supp. 1049 (Sup. Ct. 1912). Contra, e.g., Cadgene v. Cadgene,
17 N.J. Misc. 332, 8 A.2d 858 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd, 124 N.J.L. 566, 12 A.2d 635 (1940).
20Morris v. McCarty, 158 Mass. 11, 32 N.E. 938 (1893); Simons v. Bollinger, 154

Ind. 83, 84, 56 N.E. 23, 24 (1900) (dictum); 2

TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY

§431 (3d ed.

1939).
21E.g., Meyer v. Eufaula, 154 F.2d 943 (10th Cir. 1946); Mahood v. Bessemer
Properties, Inc., 154 Fla. 710, 18 So.2d 775 (1944); Campbell v. Home, 147 Fla. 523, 3
So. 2d 125 (1941); Western Holding Co. v. Northwestern Land and Loan Co., 113
Mont. 24, 120 P.2d 557 (1941); Toronto v. Sheffield, 222 P.2d 594 (Utah 1950);
Steele v. Gann, 197 Ark. 480, 485, 123 S.W.2d 520, 523 (1939) (dictum); Hart v.
Bostwick, 14 Fla. 162, 181 (1872) (dictum); Blevins v. Northwest Carolina Utilities,
Inc., 209 N.C. 683, 686, 184 S.E. 517, 519 (1936) (dictum). Although the rule stated
in the text is applicable to a chose in action belonging to a private person, it does
not apply to a chose of the state itself. Thus a statute can without the allowance
of a reasonable time extinguish immediately the right of the state or one of its
political subdivisions to recover a delinquent excise tax. Lee v. Lang, 140 Fla.
782, 192 So. 490 (1939). And it can repeal as of its effective date a statute theretofore empowering a state to recover a penal sum in a civil action. Pensacola &
A.R.R. v. State, 45 Fla. 86, 33 So. 985 (1903).
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Periods

of

thirty days, 2 - three

months,23 six months,24

and

year, 25

one
respectively, for example, have been held to be sufficient
for this purpose under most circumstances. By the generally pre2
26
vailing view, this period can consist in part or even exclusively 7 of
22Cf. Mulvey v. Boston, 197 Mass. 178, 83 N.E. 402 (1908) (holding to be
sufficient a period of 30 days in which actions could be brought by individuals to
be precluded by a statute shortening a limitations period). But cf. Berry v. Ransdall,
61 Ky. (4 Met.) 292 (1863) (holding a period of 30 days to be unreasonably short
for such a purpose).
23Cf. DeMoss v. Newton, 31 Ind. 219 (1869) (holding that a limitations period
can thus be established retrospectively with respect to a right springing from
legislative enactment but declining to pass unnecessarily on the question as to
whether the rule is applicable in the case of a right arising from contract); Kozisek
v. Brigham, 169 Minn. 57, 210 N.W. 622 (1926). Contra, Central Mo. Tel. Co. v.
Conwell, 170 F.2d 641 (8th Cir. 1948).
24Kendall v. Keith Furnace Co., 162 F.2d 1002 (8th Cir. 1947); Tipton v. Smythe,
78 Ark. 392, 94 S.W. 678 (1906); Barott v. Proctor, 128 Fla. 63, 174 So. 404 (1937);
People v. Turner, 145 N.Y. 459, 40 N.E. 400 (1895), aff'd, 168 U.S. 90 (1897).
But cf. Pearce's Heirs v. Patton, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 162 (1846); Sherman v. Nason,
25 Mont. 283, 64 Pac. 768 (1901); Blevins v. Northwest Carolina Utilities, Inc., 209
N.C. 683, 184 S.E. 517 (1936) (holding unreasonably short as to the existing controversy a 6-month period allowed before the taking effect retrospectively of a
statute reducing an existing limitations period).
25Wolfe v. Phillips, 172 F.2d 481 (10th Cir. 1949); Campbell v. Home, 147 Fla.
523, 3 So.2d 125 (1941); Krone v. Krone, 37 Mich. 307 (1877); Volz v. Steiner, 67
App. Div. 504, 73 N.Y. Supp. (Ist Dep't 1902). Contra, Pereles v. Watertown, 19
Fed. Cas. 272, No. 10,980 (C.C.W.D. Wis. 1874) (involving an issue of municipal
bonds largely owned in other states and abroad).
20Cf. Wooster v. Bateman, 126 Iowa 552, 102 N.W. 521 (1905); State v. Jones, 21
Md. 432 (1864); Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. Braithwaite, 7 N.D. 538, 75 N.W. 244
(1898); Reid v. Solar Corp., 69 F. Supp. 626, 637 (N.D. Iowa 1946) (dictum).
27Cummings v. Rosenberg, 12 Ariz. 327, 100 Pac. 810 (1909) (such period of 5
months and 10 days held sufficient); Mulvey v. Boston, 197 Mass. 178, 83 N.E. 402
(1908) (such period of 30 days held sufficient); Smith v. Morrison, 22 Pick. 430
(Mass. 1839) (such period of 5 months and 20 days held sufficient); Duncan v. Cobb,
32 Minn. 460, 21 N.W. 714 (1884); Eaton v. Manitowoc County, 40 Wis. 668 (1876);
PATrON, TrrLas §59 (1938); cf. Steele v. Gann, 197 Ark. 480, 123 S.W.2d 520 (1939)
(such period of 90 days between the enactment and effective date of a statute
shortening a limitations period held sufficient); Osborne v. Lindstrom, 9 N.D. 1,
81 N.W. 72 (1899) (such period of 9 months and 30 days held sufficient). Contra,
Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich. 318 (1865); Gilbert v. Ackerman, 159 N.Y. 118, 53 N.E.
753 (1899); Rochester Sav. Bank v. Stoeltzen & Tapper, Inc., 176 Misc. 140, 26
N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. 1941); Malossi v. McElligott, 166 Misc. 513, 2 N.Y.S.2d 712
(Sup. Ct. 1938); Hastings v. H. M. Byllesby & Co., 293 N.Y. 413, 420, 57 N.E.2d 737,
741 (1944) (dictum); Adams & Freese Co. v. Kenoyer, 17 N.D. 302, 307, 116 N.W. 98,
99 (1908) (dictum).
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the time elapsing between the enactment of the statute and its
effective date if the resulting interval is sufficient to constitute a
reasonable time.
It is readily apparent that the upholding of very short periods
in this connection may result in the extinguishment of choses in
action of individuals who have had no real opportunity to learn of the
change in the law. This writer investigated a point of Florida law at
the request of a foreign attorney soon after the conclusion of the 1951
legislative session. The question seemed easy of solution, since it had
long been settled by existing Florida decisions. No statute concerning
it had been passed at previous sessions, and a careful search of such
slip laws as were then available and of the usually adequate complete index summary of the laws of the 1951 session indicated that
the matter was still unaffected by statute. He was embarrased by the
necessity of telegraphing, several days after submitting his report, that
an incidental reading of the Lawyer's Weekly Report of a national
service had disclosed that the rule in point had after all been changed
by a new statute that had become effective shortly before the happening of the event that gave rise to the inquiry. And, to add injury to
an old phrase may be reversed in a not entirely approinsult -if
priate context - the innovation curtailed greatly the interests of
the correspondent's client.
To extinguish in a period of much less than a year existing choses
in action that are for the first time brought within the scope of a
statute of limitations is indeed to subject laymen unnecessarily and
with a vengence to the consequences of their lack of knowledge of
28
new law of which they can scarcely be expected to have information.
In many jurisdictions, however, this argument must be addressed to
the legislature rather than to the court. And while a six-months
period of this kind has been upheld in Florida, 29 it can be observed
that in enacting new statutes containing limitations provisions the
2sSee Adams & Freese Co. v. Kennoyer, 17 N.D. 302, 116 NAV. 98 (1908). In
Cranston v. New Process Fibre Co., 74 A.2d 818 (Del. Sup. 1950), however, the
court, in sustaining as reasonable a 6-months grace period prior to the taking
effect retrospectively of a shortened limitations period, stated that if the usual

lapse of a year between the close of the session and the printing of the session laws
is a proper matter for judicial notice, so also is the fact that information about the
new laws is disseminated by daily press reports of the activities of the legislature
and by calendars available upon request that give the title and status of pending
and enacted bills.
29Barnott v. Proctor, 128 Fla. 63, 174 So. 404 (1937).
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Florida Legislature has in most instances in recent years allowed a
period of a year or longer.
In the absence of a constitutional prohibition, a statute can
shorten, even as to existing causes of action that have not been barred
by the prior law, a previously established limitations period, provided
it allows a reasonable time in which they can be enforced.3o And it
has occasionally been held that even when the period allowed by such
a statute is unreasonably short, an individual is precluded from prosecuting a claim within its scope when he refrains from bringing his
action for a time subsequent to the enactment of the statute that
would have been reasonable if it had been the period provided by
the statute. 31 In most decisions in which this principle would have
been relevant, however, the courts have refrained from applying it
to the facts before them.32 In some of these cases so great a delay by
3oE.g., Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628 (1877) (period of 9 months and 17 days
held reasonable); Steele v. Gann, 197 Ark. 480, 123 S.W.2d 520 (1939) (period of
90 days held reasonable); Hart v. Bostwick, 14 Fla. 162 (1872) (decided before the
inclusion in the state constitution of the provision of §33 of art. 3 of the present
constitution that no statute shall be enacted that shortens "the time within which a
civil action may be commenced on any cause of action existing at the time of its
passage'); Collier v. Smaltz, 149 Iowa 230, 128 N.W.396 (1910); Wooster v. Bateman,
126 Iowa 552, 102 N.W. 521 (1905); Mulven v. Boston, 197 Mass. 178, 85 N.E. 402
(1908) (period of 30 days held reasonable); Osborne v. Lindstrom, 9 N.D. 1, 81 N.W.
72 (1899) (period of 9 months and 30 days held reasonable); Cummings v. Rosenberg, 12 Ariz. 327, 329, 100 Pac. 810, 811 (1909) (dictum); Dee v. State Tax Comm'n,
257 App. Div. 531, 535, 13 N.Y.S.2d 719, 722 (3d Dep't 1939) (dictum); Blevins v.
Northwest Carolina Utilities, Inc., 209 N.C. 683, 686, 184 S.E. 517, 519 (1936)
(dictum).
3Sherman v. Nason, 25 Mont. 283, 64 Pac. 768 (1901) (holding that, although
a shortened period of 6 months was unreasonable, the plaintiff was preduded from
taking advantage of that fact by his failure to bring his action for a further period
of one year, 11 months, and 29 days); Holcombe v. Tracy, 2 Minn. 241, 246 (1868)
(dictum).
32Central Mo. Tel. Co. v. Conwell, 170 F.2d 641 (8th Cir. 1948) (holding unreasonable as to an existing cause of action a shortened limitations period of
90 days that became effective in 1945, even though the plaintiff made no attempt
to enforce it until Jan. 2, 1947); Lamb v. Powder River Live Stock Co., 132 Fed.
434 (8th Cir. 1904); Adams &Freese Co. v. Kenoyer, 17 N.D. 302, 116 N.W. 98 (1908)
(alternative holding that a shortened period of 3 months and 20 days was unreasonable as to an existing chose, although the plaintiff did not bring his action until
6 months and 20 days after the termination of that period); accord, Berry v. Ransdall, 61 Ky. (4 fet.) 292 (1863) (holding unconstitutional as to an existing chose
not theretofore subject to any limitations statute the application of a new statute
that allowed only 30 days in which an action on it could be brought, although the
plaintiff had not begun his action until one year and 11 days after the statute
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the plaintiff in bringing his action after the enactment of the new
statute has been held not to deprive him of his right to object to
the unreasonableness of the shortened period as to indicate that no
delay, however long, would have that effect. In Lamb v. Powder River
Live Stock Co., 33 for example, a newly enacted statute reduced the

time in which an action could be brought in Colorado on certain
foreign judgments from six years to three months following the rendition of the judgment. The period of three months was held to be
unreasonably short as to the holder of such a judgment that had
been rendered in Nebraska one month and twenty-five days before
the enactment of the new statute, although he did not bring his
action on it in Colorado until five years, nine months, and sixteen
days after the effective date of the act.
The Constitution of Florida forbids such reductions of limitations
periods in so far as they apply to existing causes of action. Section
33 of article III of that instrument reads: "No statute shall be passed
lessening the time within which a civil action may be commenced
on any cause of action existing at the time of its passage."
The decision of Baugher v. Boley34 illustrates the operation of
this provision. In that case the defendant, who had no color of title
to the plaintiff's land, began to construct a fence around it at a time
when, under the statute35 then in effect, the period of adverse possession without color of title that was sufficient to bar the true owner
was twenty years. The fence was completed at about the effective
date of a new statute 38 that reduced the period in question to
seven years. In the plaintiff's action of ejectment the trial court instructed the jury that if the defendant's substantial enclosure was
completed prior to the effective date of the new act, the twenty-year
period that would then have become applicable could not subsequently be reduced. It instructed further that if the enclosure was
not completed until after that date a possession of seven years thereafter would bar the right of the plaintiff to recover his land. These
became effective); Reid v. Solar Corp., 69 F. Supp. 626, 638 (N.D. Iowa 1946) (dictum) (stating that the plaintiff's delay in bringing action on a previously existing
chose until one year and 13 days after the enactment of a statute reducing to 6
months the former limitations period and until 9 months and 7 days after its
effective date was not so unreasonably long as to deprive him of his right to question
the reasonableness of the 6-month period).
33132 Fed. 434 (8th Cir. 1904).
3463 Fla. 75, 58 So. 980 (1912).
35FIa. Laws 1895, c. 4412.
36Fla. Laws 1901, c. 4916.
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instructions were upheld on appeal and the judgment for the defendant was affirmed.
The Florida Court has properly held that this constitutional provision does not forbid, even as to existing claims, the enactment of a
new nonclaim statute that reduces the period in which a creditor
can file his claim against the estate of a decedent. These nonclaim
statutes are not statutes of limitations, since they differ from them in
purpose and since they begin to run when notice to creditors is
published and not at the time when the cause of action on the obligation arises.37 In Estate of Woods38 it was held permissible to reduce
this period by a new nonclaim statute that was enacted after the
debtor incurred the obligation in question and prior to his death.
Since that holding is based in part upon the concept that the filing
of a claim against the estate of a decedent is not "a civil action"
within the terms of section 33 of article III of the Constitution, 39 it
seems that a statute, even though enacted after the death of a decedent, can reduce the period in which such a claim can be filed provided a reasonable time remains in which the creditor can act.
An admittedly not entirely exhaustive search indicates that this
prohibition of the reduction of a limitations period as to existing causes
of action is not to be found in the constitution of any other jurisdiction. One phase of the operation of the prohibition is desirable.
Since it forbids any reduction of a limitations period in the case of
an existing cause of action, it of course prevents the cutting down of
the time theretofore available for the bringing of such an action, to
a period following the enactment of a new statute that is of sufficient
duration to be upheld by the courts as reasonable although it is
actually too brief to afford an adequate opportunity to the plaintiff
to learn of the change in the law.
This advantage is otherwise more than counterbalanced, however.
The prohibition renders newly established limitations provisions unconstitutional as to many factual situations. Suppose, for example, that
a defendant is in possession of land under a defective title and that
the existing statute with reference to adverse possession or some other
limitations act gives the plaintiff, who is the owner of a vested interest
in the land, seven years from the accrual of his cause of action in
which to recover the land. If a statute is passed that purports to
37Estate of Woods, 135 Fla. 730, 183 So. 10 (1938).
381bid.

39See also Bradford v. Shine, 13 Fla. 393 (1870).
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validate the defendant's title unless it is attacked within a year of
the effective date of the act, it cannot be applied to the plaintiff when
its new limitations period is less than the portion of the seven-year
period that remains available to him under the original act. 40 This
situation renders the Florida curative acts with limitations provisions
ineffectual in many factual settings that are within the express provisions of the acts, with the result that purchasers who rely upon
them are likely to be misled.
In the proposed new state constitution drafted by the Constitution
Committee of The Florida Bar, section 33 of article III of the present
Constitution is replaced by the following provision: 41
"No statute shall be passed lessening the time within which a
civil action may be commenced on any cause of action existing
at the time of its passage without providing a period of at least
one year within which action may be commenced thereon."
The suggested change is desirable. 42 It preserves the beneficial feature
of the present provision and eliminates the disadvantages that accompany it.
A further qualification has been imposed on the present constitutional provision by the Florida Court that, although violative
of the principles of statutory construction, reduces somewhat the
frequency of its undesirable operation. The constitutional prohibition is held not to prevent the establishment of a limitations period,
even as to existing causes of action, in instances when the action was
not previously subject to any limitations period and could therefore,
43
except for the new statute, be maintained at any time in the future.
4OThe existence of this principle has upon occasion been recognized and guarded
against by the Legislature of Florida. Chapter 10168 of Fla. Laws 1925 provided

that when one or more of the heirs or devisees of a decedent should purport
to convey the entire interest of the decedent in land, no person should after 20
years from the recording of the deed claim any part of the land as heir, devisee, or
otherwise under the decedent. FLA. STAT. §95.22 (1951) (effective July 1, 1941), in
reducing this period subsequent to the recording of such a deed from 20 years to
7 years, expressly retained the former 20-year period in the case of deeds of the
lands of decedents who had died before the effective date of the new act. See
Rogers, Chapter 20954, Acts of 1941, 15 FLA. L.J. 276, 280 (1941).
4lProposed Constitution for Florida, art. III, §27.
42
Day, The Period During Which a Judgment Remains a Lien on Realty in
Florida, 2 U. FLA. L. Rv. 315, 328 (1949).
43Campbell v. Home, 147 Fla. 523, 3 So.2d 125 (1941) (alternative holding);
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In this situation, as in all others, a reasonable time must of course
be allowed after the effective date of the statute for the enforcement
44
of existing actions.
Existence of a Cause of Action As a Prerequisiteto Operation
of a Limitations Act
The period of a statute of limitations that bars the right of an
owner to recover his land and divests him of his ownership of it does
not begin to run until there accrues to him a cause of action to recover the land. 43 Curative acts with limitations provisions, when
designed to rectify title defects that are beyond the remedial power
of a pure curative act 46 and hence to extinguish vested interests, are
statutes of limitations of this type. They are, consequently, by the
great weight of authority and better view, subject to the foregoing
rule,47 particularly when the interest sought to be precluded is a
possessory one and the owner of the interest is in possession of the
land.48
Lee v. Lang, 140 Fla. 782, 192 So. 490 (1939) (alternative holding); accord, H. K. L.
Realty Corp. v. Kirtley, 74 So.2d 876 (Fla. 1954).
44C0. Campbell v. Home, 147 Fla. 523, 3 So.2d 125 (1941).
451 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY §4.113 (Casner ed. 1952); 3 id. §15.8; 4 TIFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY §§1152, 1184 (3d ed. 1939); accord, Grayson v. Harris, 279 U.S. 300
(1929); Redfield v. Parks, 132 U.S. 239 (1889); Amory v. Amherst College, 229 Mass.
374, 118 N.E. 933 (1918); Stonum v. Davis, 348 Mo. 267, 152 S.W.2d 1067 (1941);
Northern Pac. Ry. v. Smith, 62 Mont. 108, 203 Pac. 503 (1921); PATRON, TrrL.xs §59
(1938); SCURLOCK, RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION AFFECTING INTERESTS IN LAND 47 (1953).
46Curative acts with limitations provisions can cure any defect that can be
remedied by a curative act. See p. 145 supra. Title defects that can be remedied
by a curative act are discussed in Part III of this article, 8 U. FLA. L. REv. 365,
382-92 (1955).
47E.g., Pearce's Heirs v. Patton, 46 Ky. (7 B. Mon.) 162 (1846). In this case
it was held that the period of a limitations act does not run against a married
woman's right to attack her invalid conveyance during the continuance of her
husband's estate by the curtesy.
48E.g., Smith v. Cox, 115 Ala. 503, 22 So. 78 (1897) (alternative holding); Phillips
v. Jones, 79 Ark. 100, 95 SAV. 164 (1906); Charbonnet v. State Realty Co., 155 La.
1044, 99 So. 865 (1923); Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 11 (1867); Hammon v. Hatfield, 192
Minn. 259, 256 N.W. 94 (1934); Baker v. Kelley, 11 Minn. *480 (1866); Grant v.
Montgomery, 193 Miss. 175, 5 So.2d 491 (1942); Pinkham v. Pinkham, 60 Neb. 600,
83 N.V. 837 (1900); Baldwin v. Merriam, 16 Neb. 199, 20 N.W. 250 (1884); Jordan
v. Simmons, 169 N.C. 140, 85 S.E. 214 (1915) (alternative holding); Buty v. Goldfinch, 74 Wash. 532, 133 Pac. 1057 (1913); Collier v. Goessling, 160 Fed. 604, 610
(6th Cir. 1908) (dictum); Welis v. Thomas, 78 So.2d 378, 382 (Fla. 1954) (dictum);
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To permit a curative act with a limitations provision to extinguish
such an interest is to deprive its owner of his property without due
process of law. 4 9 In denying the power of the legislature to deprive

an owner of his property arbitrarily, the New York Court of Appeals
stated: 50
"To say.., that.. . 'due process of law' may mean the very
act of legislation which deprives the citizen of his rights . . .
or property, leads to a simple absurdity. The Constitution
would then mean, that no person shall be deprived of his
property or rights, unless the Legislature shall pass a law to
effectuate the wrong, and this would be throwing the restraint
entirely away. The true interpretation of these constitutional
phrases is, that . . . there is no power in any branch of the

government to take them away ......
This language has been quoted with approval by the Supreme Courts
of Kansas5' and Minnesota 52 in cases involving curative acts with
limitations provisions.
A number of jurisdictions hold that, even when the land is unJohnston v. Ellsworth Trust Co., 63 Fla. 443, 447, 58 So. 249, 250 (1912) (dictum);
Toronto v. Sheffield, 118 Utah 460, 466, 222 P.2d 594, 597 (1950) (dictum); cf.
Florida Say. Bank v. Brittain, 20 Fla. 507 (1884); Turner v. New York, 168 U.S. 90, 95
(1897) (dictum); Meigs v. Roberts, 162 N.Y. 371, 379, 56 N.E. 838, 840 (1900)
(dictum); Joslyn v. Rockwell, 128 N.Y. 334, 28 N.E. 604, 605 (1891) (dictum).
Contra, Newland v. Marsh, 19 Ill. 376, 385 (1857) (dictum). See also Annot., 7
A.L.R.2d 1366 (1949); 46 L.R.A. (N.s.) 1065 (1913).
49E.g., Murrison v. Fenstermacher, 166 Kan. 568, 203 P.2d 160 (1949); Charbonnet v. State Realty Co., 155 La. 1044, 99 So. 865 (1923); Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 11
(1867); Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 329 (1865); Dingey v. Paxton, 60 Miss. 1038
(1883); Leavenworth v. Claughton, 197 Miss. 606, 621, 20 So.2d 821, 822 (1945)
(dictum); accord, Baker v. Kelley, 11 Minn. *480 (1866); Buty v. Goldfinch, 74 Wash.
532, 133 Pac. 1057 (1913); Collier v. Goessling, 160 Fed. 604, 610 (6th Cir. 1908)
(dictum).
U.S. CONsT. amend. V, effective since the latter part of 1791, forbids the federal
government to deprive one of his property without due process of law. Id. amend.
XIV, which was promulgated as being in effect on July 28, 1868, provides that no
state shall deprive any person of property without due process of law. Similarly,
the constitutions of most of the states prohibit the taking of property without due
process, e.g., FLA. CONST. Decl. of Rights §12.
5OWynehamer v. The People, 13 N.Y. (3 Kern.) 378, 392 (1856).
SiMurrison v. Fenstermacher, 166 Kan. 568, 574, 203 P.2d 160, 164 (1949).
52Baker v. Kelley, 11 Minn. *480, 488 (1866).
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occupied by anyone, the period of a curative act with a limitations
provision does not extinguish an interest that is beyond the reach
of a mere curative act.53 In such a situation, the constructive possession is in the true owner. The Supreme Court of Kansas, for ex54
The case
ample, took this position in Murrison v. Fenstermacher.
involved a statute which provided that when one other than the
owner of land platted it as a town and the plat had been of record
for more than twenty-five years, a deed to any part of the land executed by that person should be conclusively presumed to be valid
after it had been recorded for more than twenty-five years unless the
owner should contest its validity within one year of the effective date of
the act. 5 It was held that to apply this statute to a situation in which
the holder of the invalid deed had not been in possession of the land
during the running of the limitations period would be to deprive the
true owner of his property without due process of law even if he
also had not been in possession during that period.
The instances in which curative acts with limitations provisions
have been held unconstitutional as violating the principles under consideration have most frequently involved statutes that were designed
to validate void tax deeds.56 Similar statutes directed toward other
defective instruments or transactions are, however, equally subject to these principles. The treatment accorded the statute involved
in the Murrison case is illustrative of this fact. A limitations act has
similarly been held not to run against a grantee's right to have his
deed reformed for mistake as long as he remains in possession of the
53E.g., Murrison v. Fenstermacher, 166 Kan. 568, 203 P.2d 160 (1949); Groesbeck
v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 329 (1865); Leavenworth v. Claughton, 197 Miss. 618, 20 So.2d
821 (1945); Leavenworth v. Claughton, 197 Miss. 606, 19 So.2d 815 (1944); Grant
v. Montgomery, 193 Miss. 175, 5 So.2d 491 (1942); Dingey v. Paxton, 60 Miss. 1038
(1883); Waln v. Sherman, 8 S. & R. 357 (Pa. 1822); Gardner v. Reedy, 62 S.C. 503,
40 S.E. 947 (1902); accord, Baldwin v. Merriam, 16 Neb. 199, 20 N.W. 250 (1884);
Smith v. Cox, 115 Ala. 503, 510, 22 So. 78, 80 (1897) (dictum). Contra, Turner v.
New York, 168 U.S. 90 (1897).
54See note 53 supra.
55KAN. GrN. STAT. §67-612 (Corrick 1949).
50E.g., Smith v. Cox, 115 Ala. 503, 22 So. 78 (1897); Charbonnet v. State Realty
Co., 155 La. 1044, 99 So. 865 (1923); Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 11 (1867); Groesbeck v.
Seeley, 13 Mich. 329 (1865); Baker v. Kelley, 11 Minn. 480 (1866); Leavenworth v.
Claughton, 197 Miss. 606, 19 So.2d 815 (1944); Grant v. Montgomery, 193 Miss.
175, 5 So.2d 491 (1942); Dingey v. Paxton, 60 Miss. 1038 (1883); Baldwin v. Merriam,
16 Neb. 199, 20 N.W. 250 (1884); Jordan v. Simmons, 169 N.C. 140, 85 S.W. 214
(1915); Buty v. Goldfinch, 74 Wash. 532, 133 Pac. 1057 (1913).
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land. 5? And a limitations act has been held to be inapplicable to the
right of a grantor of a deed absolute in terms to show that it was intended as a mortgage when the grantee has never taken possession
of the land. s8
In cases involving tax deeds, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
speciously circumvents the rule that when land is unoccupied by
anyone the period of a curative act with a limitations provision does
not extinguish an interest that is beyond the reach of a mere curative
act. Under statutes providing respectively that the action of an
owner to recover his land sold for taxes is barred three years from
the recording of the tax deed 59 and that when lands are unoccupied
the owner can maintain ejectment against a person claiming title to
them at the commencement of the action," ° the Wisconsin court holds
57Pinkham v. Pinkham, 60 Neb. 600, 83 N.W. 837 (1900).
58Mott v. Fiske, 155 Ind. 597, 58 N.E. 1053 (1900). Grable v. Nunez, 64 So.2d
154 (Fla. 1953), is not at variance with the Mott case. In the latter decision the
instrument in question, if actually an absolute deed, gave to the grantee the right
to possess the land. This was not true of the instrument involved in Grable v.
Nunez. That instrument purported by its terms to be an absolute transfer of a
beneficiary's interest in a trust. The right to possession-and the actual possession-of the trust assets remained throughout in a third person, the trustee,
regardless of whether the instrument was an absolute transfer or a mere mortgage.
The holding that the expiration of the 20-year limitations period of FLA. STAT.
§95.23 (1955) precluded the grantor from showing that the instrument was intended
as a mortgage therefore was not a deviation from the principle that the period
of a statute of limitations that bars the right of an owner to recover his land
does not begin to run until there accrues to him a cause of action to recover the
land.
The holding in the Grable case is somewhat analogous to that in Fitger v.
Alger Smith & Co., 130 Minn. 520, 153 N.W. 997 (1915). In the Fitger case the
defendant entered into adverse possession of land that had previously been mortgaged by its owner. Soon thereafter the mortgagee attempted to foreclose but
failed to comply with a statutory requirement that notice be served on the defendant as the person in possession. A statute provided that a foreclosure could
be attacked because of such a defect only within 5 years. It was held that at the
expiration of that period the defect was cured both as against the owner and
the adverse possessor. A limitations act can run in favor of a claimant and against
an owner who, due to the fact that the land is adversely possessed by a third
person, has neither actual nor constructive possession of it.
5oWis. REv. STAT. c. 15, §123 (1849). This statute is no longer in effect.
6oWis. STAT. §275.03 (1953). A similar attempt was made in an early Florida
tax statute to evade the rule that when land is unoccupied by anyone the period
of a curative act with a limitations provision does not extinguish an interest that
is beyond the reach of a mere curative act. Fla. Laws 1874, c. 1976, §63, after
forbidding a delinquent taxpayer to bring suit subsequent to one year from the
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that the tax deed, though invalid, is rendered immune from attack
three years after its recordation if during that time the land is not
in the possession of the delinquent taxpayer or some third person.,'
The position is taken that under such circumstances the recorded tax
deed vests the constructive possession of the land in the holder of
62
the tax deed.
The Supreme Court of the United States applied this Wisconsin
rule in Leffingwell v. Warren63 to facts controlled by the law of that
state. It is to be observed, however, that this decision was prior to the
adoption of the fourteenth amendment, which, for the first time, incorporated in the Constitution of the United States a provision forbidding the states to deprive one of his property without due process
of law.
The Wisconsin doctrine is erroneous. Such a purported giving
to a landowner, by either express or implied statutory provision or
otherwise, of a cause of action to recover his land that has not been
invaded is an attempt to evade by subterfuge the rule that a limitarecording of a deed made "in pursuance of any sale for taxes" to set aside the
deed or to recover the lands from the grantee therein named, provided that "the
recording of such deed shall be deemed such assertion of title or such entry into
possession by the grantee . . . as to authorize such suit or proceedings against
him ... as for an actual entry." It was held in Sloan v. Sloan, 25 Fla. 53, 5 So. 603
(1889), that a tax deed resulting from an assessment made by the county collector
instead of by the assessor was not a deed made "in pursuance of any sales for taxes"
and that therefore the defect was not cured by the expiration of the limitations
period of the statute. The same position was taken in Townsend v. Edwards, 25
Fla. 582, 6 So. 212 (1889), with reference to a tax deed based on taxes for a year
in which the land had not been assessed on the roll. The United States Supreme
Court in Bird v. Benlisa, 142 U.S. 664 (1892), applied this theory concerning the
Florida statute to a tax deed of land that had been improperly described on the
assessment roll.
The result attained in the three cases could have been reached on the ground
that the attempt of the statute to create an action for "an actual entry" when there
had been no entry, which is the case when the lands are either unoccupied or in
the possession of the delinquent taxpayer, was without effect; and that consequently the statute in such instances violated the rule that it unsuccessfully
sought to evade. Such a holding would have permitted the limitations provision
of the statute to operate when the holder of even a seriously defective tax deed
was in possession of the land. The effect of the statute in a situation of the type
mentioned is abrograted by the theory actually adopted in the three decisions.
O'Parish v. Eager, 15 Wis. *532 (1862); Knox v. Cleveland, 13 Wis. *245 (1860);
Hill v. Kricke, 11 Wis. *442 (1860).
02Parish v. Eager, 15 Wis. 0532 (1862).
0267 U.S. (2 Black) 599 (1862).
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tions act does not run against the owner of land until he has a cause
of action to recover it. The Supreme Court of Mississippi has co4
gently summarized this situation as follows:6
"'[Tlhere is a wide distinction between that legislation which
requires one having a mere right to sue, to pursue the right
speedily, and that which creates the necessity for suit by converting an estate in possession into a mere right of action, and
then limits the time in which the suit may be brought.' In other
words, the legislature has no power to create and bring into
existence a right of action which does not exist in fact. It cannot by legislative fiat set up, Don Quixote like, an imaginary
windmill and command the property owner to charge and demolish it by legal proceedings within a stated time."
Closely related to the principle that a curative act with a limitations
provision cannot validate a seriously defective tax deed when neither
the actual possession nor the constructive possession of the delinquent
taxpayer is invaded is the rule that the expiration of the limitations
period of such an act cannot as to jurisdictional matters raise a conclusive presumption of the regularity of the proceedings leading to
the issuance of the deed.6 5 Effect can be given, however, to a provision of a statute of this kind that the expiration of its limitations
provision raises a rebuttable presumption of the regularity of the
proceedings on which a tax deed is based. 66
64Leavenworth v. Claughton, 197 Miss. 606, 621, 20 So.2d 821, 822 (1945). This
Mississippi decision involved a statute which provided that a delinquent taxpayer
could attack an invalid tax deed only within a period of two years from the date
of its issuance. It was held to be a denial of due process to permit this period

to begin to run prior to the time that the possession of the taxpayer was invaded
by the holder of the tax deed, regardless of whether the possession of the taxpayer was actual or merely constructive.
65E.g., Marx v. Hanthorn, 148 U.S. 172 (1893) (alternative holding); Collier
v. Goessling, 160 Fed. 604 (6th Cir. 1908); Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 329 (1865);
accord, Baker v. Kelley, 11 Minn. 480 (1866); cf. Wells v. Thomas, 78 So.2d 378
(Fla. 1955); Quinlon v. Rogers, 12 Mich. 168 (1863); Ensign v. Barse, 107 N.Y. 329,
338, 14 N.E. 400, 402 (1887) (dictum). Contra, Florida Say. Bank v. Brittain, 20
Fla. 507, 514 (1884) (dictum); cf. Turner v. New York, 168 U.S, 90 (1897); De
Treville v. Smalls, 98 U.S. 517 (1878).
66E.g., Wells v. Thomas, 78 So.2d 378 (Fla. 1955); Ensign v. Barse, 107 N.Y.
329, 14 N.E. 400 (1887); Marx v. Hanthorn, 148 U.S. 172, 182 (1892) (dictum);
Collier v. Goessling, 160 Fed. 604, 608 (6th Cir. 1908) (dictum); Groesbeck v.
Seeley, 13 Mich. 329, 340 (1865) (dictum).
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Attention is directed to certain Florida decisions concerning the
application to tax deeds of curative acts with limitations provisions.
In Baldwin Co. v. Blaisdel67 and in Buck v. Triplett6s the Florida
Court quieted the title of the holder of a tax deed by applying the
69
following statute:
"Wherever a tax deed has been issued ... conveying or attempting to convey . . . real estate . . ., no action shall be
brought by the former owner thereof . . . against the grantee
in said tax deed ... where the grantee ... [has] paid the taxes
assessed against the land described in the said tax deed for...
twenty successive years, at any time after the issuance of said
tax deed, but the grantee in said tax deed, . . . may, at his
option, file a bill to quiet the title to the lands described in
said tax deed .... "
In neither decision was the statement made that the tax deed in
question or the proceedings leading to its issuance were irregular,
but in each an obvious purpose of the suit was to remedy such possible
irregularities. If the deed was irregular merely with reference to formal
defects of a type that could be cured even by a pure curative act,
it could of course be validated by this act-a curative act with a
limitations provision. If, however, the deed was void for jurisdictional defects, it could not by the generally accepted view be validated by such an act unless the possession of the land during the
running of the period was such as to give the delinquent taxpayer an
action for its recovery;70 and in neither decision was it stated who had
possession during the twenty-year period. If, as is perhaps true, the
0782 So.2d 587 (Fla. 1955).
08159 Fla. 772, 32 So.2d 753 (1947).
GOFLA. STAT. §196.09 (1955). An accompanying statute, id. §196.11, not mentioned

in either decision, reads as follows:
"The provisions of §§196.09 and 196.10 shall apply whether there has
or has not been any actual possession of said premises described in the tax
deed by the grantee in the tax deed, his heirs, devisees or assigns, except
that if a tax deed has been issued, conveying or attempting to convey real
estate in the actual possession of a legal owner thereof, and the legal owner,
his heirs, devisees or assigns, continue in the possession thereof for a period of
one year after the issuance of the tax deed before, any action at law or
proceeding in equity is commenced to dispossess the party ... in possession,
then the provisions of said sections shall not apply."
70See note 45 supra and accompanying text.
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Court was willing to apply the statute to the situation last stated
regardless of who had possession of the land during the running of
the period, most of the authorities it cites do not support it.
In the Baldwin Co. case the Court relied primarily upon Putzer
v. Homeridge Properties,Inc. 71 In the latter case, the holder of the

tax deed was in actual, open, and notorious possession of the land
during the running of the four-year limitations period of the statute, 72
which was properly applied. In the Buck case, the Court stated:73
"[T]he general rule is that statutes of this character[74] are not
unconstitutional. See 34 Am. Jur., Sec. 18 et. seq; 51 Am. Jur.,
p. 995, Sec. 1155. At an early date we impliedly recognized the
legislative power to enact similar statutes. See Florida Savings
Bank v. Brittain et al., 20 Fla. 507; Carncross v. Lykes, 22 Fla.
587."
Section 18 of the title "Limitation of Actions" in 34 American Jurisprudence states that the legislative body ordinarily can enact statutes
of limitations applicable to existing causes of action provided the time
left in which to sue is not unreasonable. Section 20 of the same title,
however, reads as follows:
"Although the right to commence.., an action may be lost
by delay, it is a well-established principle that the right to defend against a suit for the possession of property is never outlawed. Hence, a statute cannot be sustained as one of limitations where it requires a party in full possession and enjoyment
of property to bring an action within a given time or else
forfeit it. A person in the possession of property cannot be
required under penalty of forfeiture to bring an action against
one claiming an adverse interest or title to such property."
Section 1155 in 51 American Jurisprudence, which was cited in
the Buck case, is in the title "Taxation." That section merely deals
7157 So.2d 848 (Fla. 1952). In the Baldwin Co. case the Court applied FLA. STAT.
§95.23 (1955) as well as §196.09 to the facts at hand. What has been said as
to the relevance of possession in connection with §196.09 is equally pertinent to
§95.23.
72FLA. STAT. §196.06 (1955).
73159 Fla. 772, 774, 32 So.2d 753, 754 (1947).
74FLA. STAT. §196.09 (1955).
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generally with so-called short statutes of limitations applicable to
tax deeds. Section 1160 of the same title contains this statement:
"When... the tax deed is void on jurisdictional grounds either
upon its face or because of a fatal infirmity in the tax sale proceeding, it is everywhere held, even in states in which possession
for the requisite period under a tax deed void on its face will
operate as a bar, that the statute will not operate in favor of
a void tax deed unless actual possession is taken thereunder.
A void tax deed does not carry with it constructive possession,
whether the land described in the deed is occupied or unoccupied. Moreover, the general rule seems to be that although
a tax deed is valid upon its face and the invalidity arises because
of some latent irregularity in the proceedings, possession under
the deed is essential to the assertion of the bar of the
statute .... .
In Carncross v. Lykes7 5 which was cited in the Buck case, the
description of land on the assessment roll was indefinite. A statute provided that a former owner should not commence a suit to set aside
any deed made in pursuance of any sale of lands for taxes, or against
the grantee in such a deed to recover the lands, unless he began it
within one year after the tax deed was recorded7 6 It was held that
the delinquent taxpayer was not precluded by the statute from bringing an action to recover the land from the holder of the tax deed,
since the tax deed under these circumstances was not one made "in
pursuance of any sale of lands for taxes." The decision did not deal
with the significance of possession in the operation of statutes of
limitations.
In Buck v. Triplett the Court also cited Florida Savings Bank v.
Brittain.77 In the latter case, the land in question had not been
properly assessed on the assessment roll. The plaintiff obtained a tax
deed to the land and several years after it had been recorded brought
ejectment against the owner of the land. A statute7 s almost identical
with the one involved in Carncrossv. Lykes was in effect. It was held
7522 Fla. 587 (1886).
7OFla. Laws 1872, c. 1887, §20. The statute exempted from its operation instances in which the land in question was not subject to taxation and those in

which the taxes were paid or tendered.
720 Fla. 507 (1884).
78Fla. Laws 1874, c. 1976, §63.
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that, since the statute dealt with the barring of an action by a former
owner and not with the action of the holder of a tax deed to recover
the land from the former owner, the lapse of a year subsequent to
the recording of the tax deed did not make the tax deed conclusive
evidence in its holder's action of the regularity of the proceedings
leading to its issuance. The opinion contains a dictum that a statute
can make a tax deed which is regular in form conclusive evidence
of the regularity of all antecedent proceedings and that the statute
under consideration has this effect when an action is brought by the
79
former owner of land to recover it from the holder of the tax deed.
The principle stated in this dictum, if accepted without qualification, would bar a landowner from recovering his land from the
holder of a tax deed void for jurisdictional defects even if that holder
had not possessed the land throughout the running of a stated limitations period. As applied to such a situation, the principle is opposed by the great weight of authority.80
In several Florida cases the decision has been reached through
the application of section 95.23 of Florida Statutes 1955 to the facts
at hand. That section is a curative act with a limitations provision
and reads as follows:
"After the lapse of twenty years from the record of any deed
or the probate of any will purporting to convey lands no person
shall assert any claim to said lands as against the claimants under
such deed or will, or their successors in title.
"After the lapse of twenty years all such deeds or wills shall
be deemed valid and effectual for conveying the lands therein
described, as against all persons who have not asserted by competent record title an adverse claim."
In Moyer v. Clark8l the defendant had on July 1, 1932, purchased
unimproved land and had taken title in the name of Nutting by a
deed that was recorded on December 9, 1932. Nutting had conveyed
this land to the defendant on July 2, 1932, by a deed that was not recorded until May, 1953. After Nutting's death, her administratrix
had on April 20, 1953, conveyed the land to the plaintiff, who allegedly
took with knowledge of the defendant's unrecorded deed. It was correctly held that the fact that the deed to Nutting had been recorded for
7920 Fla. 507, 514 (1884).

oSee notes 47, 48 supra and accompanying text.
8172 So.2d 905 (Fla. 1954).
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twenty years did not under section 95.23 invalidate Nutting's conveyance to the defendant and that the defendant's title was superior
to that of the plaintiff if the plaintiff took his deed with knowledge
of the deed from Nutting to the defendant.
The decision contains a dictum, however, to the effect that section
95.23 validates and renders unimpeachable a deed or will that has
been of record twenty years except as to those who have asserted by
competent record an adverse claim s2 As thus stated, the dictum would
permit the statute to validate a deed even as to an imperfection that
is beyond the reach of a mere curative act and without regard to
whether the actual or constructive possession of the individual sought
to be precluded has been invaded during the running of the limitations period. The dictum is largely couched in the terms of the statute,
however, and seemingly is not significant as indicating the position
of the Court with reference to the underlying constitutional question.
Two Florida cases have so applied section 95.23 as to indicate on a
merely precursory consideration that, in the case of a defect in the
title of an opposing claimant that is beyond the remedial power of
a mere curative act, they abrogate the rule that the period of a curative
act with a limitations provision does not begin to run against the right
of a landowner to recover his land until he has a cause of action to recover it. Actually, however, they are consistent with that rule.
In Grable v. Nun ez s 3 the owner of an interest in a trust estate consisting of real property had conveyed it by a deed absolute in form.
After the deed had been recorded for twenty-nine years, the heirs of
the grantor sought by suit to nullify the instrument as an absolute
conveyance and to have it construed as a mortgage. It was held that
even if the deed was intended as a mortgage the heirs of the grantor
were precluded by section 95.23 from establishing that fact.
The decision is correct and is consistent with the rule under consideration. The statutory limitations period of twenty years from the
recording of the deed, as applied to the facts at hand, merely extinguished the right of the grantor to show that the instrument was
intended as a mortgage. At no time did he have a right to recover
the land, since both the possession of it and the right to possess it
were contiguously in the trustee of the original trust. The grantor
had no right, therefore, to recover the land to be extinguished by
the statute.
82Id. at 906.

8364 So.2d 154 (Fla. 1953).
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In Montgomery v. Carlton8 4 it was held that a deed was not invalidated as between the parties by the fact that the grantor's acknowledgment was taken by the grantee. It was further held that even if
the contrary were true the expiration of the twenty-year period of
section 95.23 would cure the defect. The holding is consistent with
the rule under consideration, since the curing of a defective acknowledgment is usually within the remedial power of a mere curative
act.85
The decision in Wright v. Blocker 8 could have been sustained
through the application of the rule. The Court, however, stated the
ratio decidendi of the case in other terms. The underlying facts of
the case were these: The defendant, an incompetent person, owned
a life estate and the plaintiffs owned the remainder in a tract of land.
In 1912 a deed purporting to convey the remainder to the defendant
and to have been executed and acknowledged by the plaintiff was
recorded. The plaintiffs in 1939 sought to enjoin the defendant from
asserting title to the remainder, on the ground that the deed was a
forgery and that the plaintiffs knew nothing of it until 1939. The
defendant objected to the introduction of evidence that the deed was
a forgery, relying upon the expiration of the limitations period of
section 95.23. It was held that the statute was inapplicable to a forged
deed and that the evidence was admissible. It is not true that a statute
of limitations is never applicable to a forged deed. A forged deed can,
for example, give color of title to an adverse possessor who has no
knowledge of the forgery.8 7 The reason actually underlying the inapplicability of the limitations provisions of section 95.23 to the allegedly forged deed in question lies in the absence of a cause of action
during the stated limitations period by which the plaintiff remaindermen could have obtained the land. Their remainder interest could
not become possessory until the termination of the defendant's life
estate.88
8499 Fla. 152, 126 So. 135 (1930).

85E.g., Maxey v. Wise, 25 Ind. 1 (1865). An additional reason why the rule under
consideration is not violated by the holding in Montgomery v. Carlton is found in
the fact that the grantee of the allegedly defective deed had been continuously in
possession of the land.
s6144 Fla. 428, 198 So. 88 (1940).

87E.g., Shingler v. Bailey, 135 Ga. 666, 70 S.E. 563 (1911); Tennis Coal Co. v.
Hensley, 198 Ky. 616, 250 S.W. 509 (1923); Hitt v. Carr, 62 Ind. App. 80, 108, 109
N.E. 456, 466 (1915) (dictum).
88The defendant life tenant in the Wright case did not enter the land under
a claim of fee originating in a transaction other than that in which his life estate
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Thompson v. Thompson so also was decided on the basis of section
95.23. This decision violates the rule that the period of a curative act
with a limitations provision does not begin to run against the right
of a landowner to recover his land, in the case of a defect in the title
of an opposing claimant that is beyond the remedial power of a mere
curative act, until there accrues to the landowner a cause of action
for the recovery of his land. In the opinion of this writer, therefore,
the decision is unsound.
These are the facts on which the case is based: A husband, motivated by a desire to defraud his creditors and under the erroneous
belief that they could subject his homestead to the payment of their
claims, made a gratuitous conveyance of that property to his wife in
1926 by a deed that was recorded at once. The couple had several
children at the time, all of whom were over the age of six. The wife
died in 1951 and left a will by which she devised that property to
one of the children, the defendant. The husband and the other children brought suit in 1953 to have the deed and will declared ineffectual
to vest the property in the defendant. It was held that the homestead
was vested in the wife and passed by her will to the defendant, since
the deed had been recorded for more than twenty years and all of
the plaintiffs had been sui juris for more than seven years and had had
both actual knowledge of the deed and constructive notice of it from
its record.
The gratuitous conveyance of the homestead to the wife was void.
The Florida Constitution provides that nothing contained therein
shall prevent the owner of homestead from devising it in the manner
prescribed by law if he has no children. 00 The provision is construed
as invalidating a gratuitous conveyance of homestead to a wife by a
husband who has children, both when he conveys to her indirectly91
and the plaintiffs' remainder arose. The situation therefore does not fall within
the undesirable rule.in effect in Florida that the life tenant's possession is adverse to

the remainderman under such circumstances. See Part II of this article, 8 U. FLA.
L. REv. 365, 374-78 (1955).
8970 So.2d 555 (Fla. 1954).
DoArt. X, §4.
01Jackson v. Jackson, 90 Fla. 563, 107 So. 255 (1925); Norton v. Baya, 88 Fla. 1,
102 So. 361 (1924); accord, Florida Nat'l Bank v. Winn, 158 Fla. 750, 30 So.2d 298
(1947) (rule applied to a gratuitous conveyance of a husband's homestead through
an intermediary to him and his wife as tenants by the entirety); Norman v. Kannon,
133 Fla. 710, 182 So. 903 (1938); Bess v. Anderson, 102 Fla. 1127, 136 So. 898 (1931);
cf. McEwen v. Larson, 136 Fla. 1, 185 So. 866 (1939); Barnott v. Proctor, 128 Fla.
63, 174 So. 404 (1937).
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through a third party intermediary and when he conveys to her
92
directly.
It was held in the Thompson case, however, that the void gratuitous
conveyance of the homestead and the subsequent devise of it by the
grantee wife to the defendant son were rendered immune from attack
by the husband and the other children by the expiration of the limitations period of section 95.23.
The possession of a wife under a void conveyance to her by her
husband of his homestead is not adverse to him when both continue
to live on the land after the conveyance. 93 It is evident, therefore,
that in the Thompson case the husband had no cause of action to
recover the land from his wife while she lived, since she did not have
even a merely voidable title to it and he was at least in joint possession of it with her.
Even more clearly, the children whose interests were extinguished
had no such cause of action during the running of the twenty-year
limitations period that the void conveyance was recorded. The lineal
descendants who inherit an estate in the homestead are those in being
at the death of its owner.94 During the life of the owner, consequently,
the children have only an expectancy with reference to the homestead.
This expectancy is not protected by the due process clause from extinction by a change during the life of the owner of homestead in the
statute controlling its descent. 95 The protection extended to it by the
Florida Constitution,98 however, should not be abrogated by the lapse
92Church v. Lee, 102 Fla. 478, 136 So. 242 (1931); cf. Semple v. Semple, 82 Fla.
138, 89 So. 638 (1921). The construction under consideration is not abrogated by
FLA. STAT. §689.11 (1955), which empowers a husband to convey real estate directly
to his wife, since the statute cannot derogate from the rights accorded by the
Constitution to the children of an owner of a homestead. Church v. Lee, supra;
Jackson v. Jackson, supra note 91.
93Jahn v. Purvis, 145 Fla. 354, 199 So. 340 (1940); cf. Gafford v. Strauss, 89 Ala.
283, 7 So. 248 (1890); Sanders v. Alford Bros. Co., 92 Fla. 718, 111 So. 278 (1926).
Contra, Massey v. Rimmer, 69 Miss. 667, 13 So. 832 (1892); Hartman v. Nettles, 64
Miss. 495, 8 So. 234 (1886).
94FLA. STAT. §§731.27, 731.23 (1955).
95Accord, Jackson v. Jackson, 90 Fla. 563, 107 So. 255 (1925); cf. Saxon v. Rawls,
51 Fla. 555, 41 So. 594 (1906). No expectancy is protected by the due process clause
from an alteration of the state of descent. Cf., e.g., James v. DuBois, 16 N.J.L. 285
(Sup. Ct. 1837); Pollock v. Speidel, 27 Ohio St. 86 (1875); Jensen v. Jensen, 54 Wyo.
224, 89 P.2d 1085 (1939); Gilpen v. Williams, 25 Ohio St. 283, 300 (1874) (dictum).
96Art. X, §4.
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of a statutory period during which the owner of the homestead is
alive.9 7
The order of the trial court on the motion to dismiss the bill of
complaint, which on appeal was quoted with seeming approval and
affirmed in Thompson v. Thompson, was expressly grounded upon
the decision in Barnott v. Proctor.98 In that case the plaintiffs' parents
in 1892, after all of the plaintiffs had been born, made a gratuitous
conveyance of the plaintiffs' father's homestead to the plaintiffs' mother
through a third party intermediary. These deeds were recorded at
once. Subsequent thereto the father continued to reside on the property with the mother and the plaintiffs until his death intestate in 1900.
At all times thereafter the mother continued to live on the former
homestead, and the plaintiffs, or some of them, lived with her or on
portions of it. She and they seemingly thought that the void conveyance of 1892 had effectively vested the title in her in fee simple; and
she and they evidently regarded their presence on the land as being
with her permission. Under the law in effect at the death of the
father in 1900, a widow could elect between dower and a child's part
in homestead, and if she failed to elect a child's part she was confined
to dower in it. 09 The mother made no such election and actually held
possession of the homestead, therefore, under a mere unassigned right
of dower.
Subsequently, the mother on dates not specified in the opinion,
with the acquiescence of all of the plaintiffs, conveyed some portions
of the homestead to third persons and other portions of it to several
of the plaintiffs, some of whom later conveyed to third persons the
tracts so granted to them. In 1928 the mother without the knowledge
of the plaintiffs mortgaged to the defendant Proctor the part of the
homestead that she had not previously conveyed. He foreclosed the
mortgage and purchased the property at the master's sale in 1931. In
1934, while a suit by him to dispossess the mother was pending in the
county judge's court, the plaintiffs brought suit against him and their
97The facts of the case of course do not bring the objecting children within the
rule of certain Florida decisions that when a life tenant takes possession originally
under a void claim of fee based on a transaction other than that from which his
life estate and the subsequent remainder emanate, the 7-year limitations period
runs against the remainderman during the continuance of the life estate if he is
aware that the life tenant is claiming the fee. See Part II of this article, 8 U. FLA.
L. REv. 365, 373-78 (1955).
08128 Fla. 63, 174 So. 404 (1937).
09FIa. Laws 1899, c. 4730, §.
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mother to have the mortgage declared invalid except as to her unassigned right of dower.
It was held that the plaintiffs, having been sui juris and having had
knowledge for many years of the recorded void deeds of 1892, and
having participated or acquiesced in conveyances by their mother
of other portions of the homestead, were precluded from the relief they
sought by chapter 10171 of the Florida Laws of 1925. Sections 1 and
2 of that chapter are the present section 95.23, on which the decision
in the Thompson case is based. Section 3 of chapter 10171 gave to
persons whose rights were adversely affected by the validation of deeds
that had been of record for twenty years on May 22, 1925, the effective
date of the act, or that would have been of record for that period at
the expiration of six months from that date, six months from May 22,
1925, in which to institute suit to protect these rights.
The Florida Court has held that, when the possession of a widow
is not inconsistent with her right to have dower assigned in the land
in question, her possession is not sufficient to start the seven-year
period of the adverse possession statute to run against the heirs.100
It has been stated by way of dictum, too, that in order for her possession to become adverse to them there must be some open assertion of
a hostile claim other than mere possession, and that notice of such
claim must be brought home to them.1lo The principle embodied in
this dictum that her possession becomes adverse under such circumstances is unsound as applied to a situation in which she is entitled
to possession until her dower is assigned, because the heirs are not
entitled to possession and cannot maintain ejectment02 Even the
fact that the heirs have the right to have her dower assigned should
not start a limitations period to run against them.03 The principle
represented by the Florida dictum has been rejected by some courts.104
It has, however, been sanctioned by others.105
l00Jahn v. Purvis, 145 Fla. 354, 199 So. 340 (1940); Mullan v. Bank of Pasco
County, 101 Fla. 1097, 133 So. 323 (1931).
lolMullan v. Bank of Pasco County, 101 Fla. 1097, 1112, 133 So. 323, 329 (1931).
102Wofford v. Martin, 183 S.W. 603 (Mo. 1916); 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY §1188
(3d ed. 1939); cf. Perkins v. Perkins, 166 S.W. 915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
1o3Foy v. Wellborn, 112 Ala. 160, 20 So. 604 (1896); 4 TIFFANY, op. Cit. supra
note 102, §1188.
Io4Wofford v. Martin, 183 S.W. 603 (Mo. 1916); Westmeyer v. Gallenkamp, 154
Mo. 28, 55 S.W. 231 (1900); Melton v. Fitch, 125 Mo. 281, 28 S.W. 612 (1894); cf.
Robinson v. Allison, 124 Ala. 325, 27 So. 461 (1900); Perkins v. Perkins, 166 S.W.
915 (Tex. Civ. App. 1914).
105White v. Williams, 260 Ala. 182, 69 So.2d 847 (1954); Brinkley v. Taylor,
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This principle, if recognized, sustains the holding in Barnott v.
Proctor that the numerous assertions of ownership in fee by the
widow, of which the children had knowledge, were sufficient to cause
the six-months limitations period of chapter 10171 to run. It has, however, no applicability to the facts of Thompson v. Thompson. In
the latter case the owner of the homestead was alive during the time
that the twenty-year period of section 95.23 was said to have run.
During that time the children had no right to have possession of the
land. They of course could not even have had dower assigned to
the wife while her husband was alive. Furthermore, under the present
law the homestead is no longer subject to dower. 10 6
Other Florida decisions have recognized that the limitations period
of section 95.23 is subject to the restrictions applicable generally to
the conventional statutes of limitations in which the acquisition of
title by adverse possession has its origin. In Walker v. Landress,07
for example, the plaintiff paid the consideration to have land conveyed to the defendant, who consequently held it subject to a resulting
trust in favor of the plaintiff. After the deed to the defendant had
been recorded for more than twenty years, he repudiated the trust
and contended that under the express provisions of section 95.23
the deed to him had become immune from attack and that the existence of the resulting trust could not be shown. His contention was
rejected on the ground that a statute of limitations does not begin
to run in favor of a trustee until he repudiates the trust. And in
Wright v. Blocker'0 8 it was held that the fact that a deed of a remainder
to a life tenant has been recorded for the twenty-year period of section
95.23 does not preclude its being shown that the deed was forged,
since statutes of limitations are inapplicable to forged deeds under
which no possession has been taken.
The statutes of limitations with reference to adverse possession
are as dearly subject to the qualifications that they do not run against
a landowner until he has a cause of action to recover the land °9 as
they are to the restrictions that are applied to section 95.23 by the
decisions discussed in the preceding paragraph. That qualification
111 Ark. 305, 163 S.W. 521 (1914); cf. Foy v. Wellborn, 112 Ala. 160, 166, 20 So.
604, 605 (1896) (dictum); Larson v. Anderson, 74 Neb. 361, 364, 104 N.W. 925, 926
(1905) (dictum); Hulvey v. Hulvey, 92 Va. 182, 187, 23 S.E. 233, 235 (1895) (dictum).
lOaFLA. STAT.

§731.34 (1955).

Fla. 356, 149 So. 545 (1933).
'osThis decision is discussed in more detail in the text at note 86 supra.
10DSee Part II of this article, 8 U. FLA. L. Rav. 365, 371 (1955).
107111
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should have been applied to section 95.23 in the Thompson case,
and the decision should have been the converse of that actually reached.
In factual situations closely paralleling that of Thompson v.
Thompson, and perhaps in even some of those seemingly involved
in the Florida tax-deed decisions previously discussed, it is probable
that the Florida Court will continue to apply the limitations provisions of curative acts to the rectification of title defects that are beyond reach of mere curative acts, and that it will do so even when the
result is to deprive the true owner of his right to recover his land at
the expiration of a period during which no cause of action for its recovery is available. In such instances the owner is deprived of his
property without due process of law.
Constitutional safeguards should be observed even in situations
in which their operation defeats so desirable an objective as the attainment of greater certainty in the title to real property. It has been
well said in another context that "if the provisions of the Constitution be not upheld when they pinch as well as when they comfort, they
may as well be abandoned.""i 0 The doctrine of stare decisis operates
with even more than its normal vigor, however, when the principle
applied in a former decision can be presumed to have been acted upon
as a rule of contracts or property;"' and particularly is this true when
the principle is one that affects the title to land."1 2 Even in such
instances a court, while applying to a pending case a principle recognized in its earlier decisions that it now regards as erroneous, can
announce that in cases arising from transactions taking place there3
after it will overrule the prior decisions."1
The doctrine of stare decisis does not require a court to extend
the scope of former decisions that it has come to regard as erroneous."'
lioHome Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 483 (1934) (dissenting
opinion).
"'E.g., Elzaburu v. Chaves, 239 U.S. 283 (1915); Brown v. Finley, 157 Ala. 424,
47 So. 577 (1908); Kissimmee v. State ex rel. Ben Hur Life Ass'n, 121 Fla. 151, 163 So.
473 (1935); Alta-Cliff Co. v. Spurway, 113 Fla. 633, 152 So. 731 (1933); Liberty Nat'l
Bank & Trust Co. v. Loomis, 275 Ky. 445, 121 S.W.2d 947 (1938); Cunningham v.
Steidman, 33 La. *44, 62 So. 346 (1913); Rabinowitz v. Keefer, 100 Fla. 1723, 1729,
132 So. 297, 299 (1931) (dictum).
112E.g., Minnesota Co. v. National Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 332 (1865); State ex rel.
Molter v. Johnson, 107 Fla. 47, 144 So. 299 (1932).
"13E.g., Payne v. City of Covington, 276 Ky. 380, 123 S.W.2d 1045 (1938); Wisconsin Lumber Co. v. State, 97 Miss. 571, 54 So. 247 (1911).
14E.g., Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895); Rabinowitz v. Keefer, 100 Fla. 1723, 132 So. 297 (1931).
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It is believed, therefore, that it is unsafe for a title examiner to rely
on the expiration of the limitations period of a curative act as having
cured a defect of title in a factual situation differing materially from
those of the Florida decisions under consideration unless the defect
could be rectified by a curative act without a limitations provision or
unless the individual whose right to recover the land it is sought to
preclude has had a cause of action for its recovery during the running
of the period.
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